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The Best and the Rest:
How Ideals Mislead and Distort—
Yet Sharpen—Comparative Evaluation
David Wiens
Abstract. Political philosophers sometimes defend the value of idealistic normative
theories by arguing that they help specify principles for evaluating feasible solutions
to real-world problems. I start by showing that this defense is ambiguous between
three interpretations, one of which I show to be a nonstarter. The second interpretation
says (roughly) that a description of a normatively ideal society provides a benchmark
from which to measure deviations from the ideal; the third says (again, roughly) that a
description of a normatively ideal society can provide useful information about the
evaluative criteria that we should use when comparing social possibilities. Against
the second defense, I show how measuring deviations from the ideal can mislead our
comparative evaluation of nonideal options. Against the third defense, I show how
descriptions of an ideal society can distort our judgments when evaluating feasible
solutions to real-world problems. I conclude by proposing a way to understand ideal
theory that enables us to vindicate the intuition that it can help us clarify our values while
still acceptingmy critical arguments. In short, we should view ideal theory not as a device
for articulating normative judgments, but for clarifying the concepts we use to articulate
such judgments.
Our world is unjust; someone should do something about it. But what, exactly, should be
done? What ends should our social reforms pursue? Who should pursue these ends, and
by what means? Answering these questions requires social scientific analysis: to provide
both credible explanations for the unjust outcomeswe observe and credible specifications
of feasible solutions. To give principled answers to these practical questions, we also
require normative principles by which we can systematically compare and evaluate
feasible options (e.g., institutional schemes, social practices, and so on) for confronting
real-world problems. Without such evaluative principles, our efforts to realize greater
justice are, at best, haphazard.
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When faced with skepticism about their role in devising practical political solutions,
many political philosophers point out that specifying principles of comparative eval-
uation is a principal task of political philosophy. “In principle, yes,” skeptics respond,
“but normative political theory has focused too much on utopian scenarios and has
thus become too far removed from the circumstances of real-world politics to be useful
for evaluating feasible solutions to real-world problems.”1 While a growing number of
political philosophers agree, many others push back: “Normative principles must give us
critical purchase on real-world politics. To achieve the necessary critical distance, our
specification of normative principles cannot be constrained by facts describing a morally
flawed status quo or by concerns about what’s feasible.”2 Put differently, if principles of
comparative evaluation are to provide appropriately normative guidance, we must look
to idealistic normative theory for guidance.3
What can be said for this defense of “ideal theory”? Not much if we understand it
in the usual ways, or so I will argue. Yet I will also suggest that, once we change our
perspective on the matter, we will see how ideal theory can nonetheless contribute to
comparative evaluation in deep and important ways.
Regarding the usual ways of thinking, I start by identifying three plausible formu-
lations of the claim that ideal theory can help us specify principles for comparatively
evaluating feasible solutions to real-world problems. I briefly show that the first of these
is tautological and thus a nonstarter. This leaves us with two viable defenses of ideal
theory. The second says (roughly) that a description of a normatively ideal society (e.g.,
1. For example, Colin Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory: A Refutation,” Political Studies 55, no. 4 (2007):
844–864; Charles W. Mills, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,”Hypatia 20, no. 3 (2005): 165–184; Amartya Sen, The
Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), chaps. 1–6 passim).
2. For diverse responses in this vein, see, among others, G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); David Estlund, “Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of
Political Philosophy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 39, no. 3 (2011): 207–237; Anca Gheaus, “The Feasibility
Constraint on the Concept of Justice,” The Philosophical Quarterly 63, no. 252 (2013): 445–464; Lisa Tessman,
“Idealizing Morality,”Hypatia 25, no. 4 (2010): 797–824; Laura Valentini, “On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal
Theory,” Journal of Political Philosophy 17, no. 3 (2009): 332–355.
3. Note that the response presented in the text is distinct from the claim that ideal theory presents an
appropriate long-range target for practical reform efforts. This claim raises issues that are distinct from
those I explore here. There is a related claim about comparative evaluation, namely, that we should evaluate
nonideal options in terms of the extent to which they facilitate (normatively acceptable) transitions to the
ideal society. I set this claim aside too, since it presupposes that our practical reform efforts should take
the ideal society as a long-run aim. For discussion on these points, see, among others, Gerald Gaus, The
Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016);
Ingrid Robeyns, “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice,” Social Theory and Practice 34, no. 3 (2008): 341–362;
David Schmidtz, “Nonideal Theory: What It Is andWhat It Needs to Be,” Ethics 121, no. 4 (2011): 772–796;
A. John Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38, no. 1 (2010): 5–36.
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an ideally just or an ideally democratic society) provides a benchmark from which to
measure deviations from the ideal; the third says (again, roughly) that a description of
a normatively ideal society, while not serving as a benchmark, can nonetheless provide
useful information about the evaluative principles we should use when comparing social
possibilities. I show that both of these claims are correct so far as they go, but that they
don’t go very far. Against the second defense, I show howmeasuring deviations from the
ideal canmislead our comparative evaluation of feasible solutions to real-world problems.
This is because our judgments of descriptive similarity to the ideal and our judgments of
comparative normative value, while both tracking changes to the same normative criteria,
can do so in different ways. While true, we should disregard the second formulation
as practically irrelevant. Turning to the third defense, I show how descriptions of an
ideal society can distort our judgments when evaluating feasible solutions to real-world
problems. This is because analyses of normatively ideal scenarios bracket the causes
and consequences of many real-world social problems; thus they have little to say about
the criteria that are most helpful for evaluating solutions to these problems or about
the trade-offs among normative criteria that are most salient in nonideal circumstances.
Since ideal theory misleads or distorts our evaluation of feasible solutions to real-world
problems, those who wish to defend it by appeal to its value for guiding practical action
in nonideal circumstances must look elsewhere.
In the wake of my arguments, I expect there will remain a strongly-held intuition that
ideal theory can nonetheless help us “disentangle, clarify, and sometimes to weigh the
competing values that can then be applied to the feasible set.”4 Some who are persuaded
bymy argumentsmight be tempted dismiss this intuition. I conclude by instead reflecting
on how we might vindicate it while accepting my arguments. I propose that we view
ideal theory not as a method for articulating normative judgments, but for clarifying the
concepts we use to articulate normative judgments. Others have suggested that ideal
theory is useful for clarifying normative concepts.5 I want to go beyond these suggestions,
however, to propose that we distinguish sharply between the normative task of specifying
how we are to value particular options—which criteria to use and how to weigh them
relative to each other—and the conceptual task of analyzing what we mean when we
4. Zofia Stemplowska and Adam Swift, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political
Philosophy, ed. David Estlund (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 386.
5. See, e.g., David Estlund, “What Good Is It? Unrealistic Political Theory and the Value of Intellectual
Work,” Analyse & Kritik 2 (2011): 395–416; Jenann Ismael, “A Philosophy of Science Looks at Idealization in
Political Theory,” Social Philosophy and Policy 33, nos. 1–2 (2016): 11–31; BenjaminMcKean, “Ideal Theory
After Auschwitz? The Practical Uses and Ideological Abuses of Political Theory as Reconciliation,” Journal of
Politics 79, no. 4 (2017): 1177–1190.
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use a concept to articulate our normative judgments. To be precise, my arguments
deny that ideal theory can help us with the normative task. Yet in choosing evaluative
criteria and weighing them against each other, we must entertain a range of evaluative
hypotheses. Which hypotheses we consider and our sense of their plausibility turns on
the concepts we use to articulate them. This, I want to suggest, is where ideal theory
can sharpen our comparative evaluation—namely, by “disentangling” closely associated
normative concepts and “clarifying” their relationships to each other so that we can better
understand the implications of candidate principles of comparative evaluation.
1. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION: THE BASICS
Principles of comparative evaluation—“evaluative principles” for short—determine and
explain a ranking of options with respect to specified criteria. Such principles constitute
a basis for making comparative judgments of the following kind: “x is better than y”, “x
is no worse than y”, “x and y are equally good”, and so on (where x and y stand in for
generic options, e.g., institutional schemes, distributive profiles, complete social worlds,
and so on). These judgments indicate that x and y stand in a particular relation to each
other: the better than relation. We can interpret this relation in various ways. Utility
theory offers a familiar interpretation: we interpret “x is better than y” to mean “x is
preferred to y”; “x and y are equally good” means “indifference between x and y”. We
need not interpret the better than relation in terms of preferences, of course. In general,
we have three broad options here. First, we can judge that x is better than y in terms of the
realization of abstract normative values such as freedom, equality, community, welfare,
security, fairness, and so on. We thus interpret the judgment “x is better than y” to say
something like “x realizes the specified values to a greater extent than y”, or perhapsmore
precisely, “x is judged better than y from some perspective that gives appropriate weight
to liberty, equality, welfare, and so on”. Second, we can judge that x is better than y in
terms of the relative strength of our reasons for bearing a positive valuing attitude toward
each of them. (The relevant “positive valuing attitude” might be preferring, desiring,
admiring, and so on; I leave the issue open here.) On this picture, “x is better than y”
means “there are normative reasons for our valuing attitude toward x to be more positive
than our valuing attitude toward y”. Third, we can judge that x is better than y in terms of
relative similarity to a privileged benchmark or reference option. On this view, “x is better
than y” means something like “x is more similar to the reference option than y”.
The first two kinds of evaluative principles—values-based and reasons-based com-
parisons—are comparative in a way that the third kind is not. The first two can be
constructed wholly from pairwise comparisons among options, without reference to any
4
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special or privileged option. The third, in contrast, is necessarily constructed by reference
to a non-comparatively analyzed reference point. This contrast will be important later. To
mark it, we refer to the first two kinds of principles as pure comparative principles and to
the third kind as benchmark comparative principles.
Two additional terms will be helpful for our discussion. An evaluative criterion is a
single dimension of comparison—a single value (such as freedom or equality), a single
class of reasons (such as reasons pertaining to entitlement satisfaction or respect for
persons), or a single dimension of similarity (i.e., similarity with respect to a specific
attribute of the reference option). An evaluative standard is a set of evaluative principles
that aggregates all relevant evaluative criteria and encodes their relative significance when
comparing options.6
2. REFINING THE TARGET
Philosophers often defend the practical value of idealistic normative theories by arguing
that such theories can help us specify an evaluative standard by which to assess feasible
solutions to real-world problems. But this claim is doubly ambiguous, owing to the
ambiguity of both “ideal theory” and “evaluative standard”. To focus our attention, let’s
take these in turn.
For our purposes, an ideal theory is simply a theory about some sort of normative
ideal.7 But “normative ideal” is ambiguous between two notions, which correspond to
what we might call the “evaluative” and the “best case scenario” uses of “ideal”.8 An
evaluative ideal theory characterizes and explains the criteria or standards we should use
6. Some might find it helpful to think of evaluative criteria as defining an n-dimensional space within
which options can be located, with each dimension measuring the extent to which a particular evaluative
criterion is realized. An evaluative standard determines a set of “indifference” (i.e., equal value) curves for
this space.
7. Although an ideal theory as we define it here typically involves the use of idealizing assumptions, we do
not make the use of idealizations a defining attribute of an ideal theory. For discussion on this point, see,
among others, Mills, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology”; Onora O’Neill, “Abstraction, Idealization, and Ideology in
Ethics,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 22 (1987): 55–69; Valentini, “On the Apparent Paradox of Ideal
Theory.”
8. Compare: “ ‘Ideal’. . . has connotations of perfection (‘he is my ideal of manliness’) but also of impossi-
bility (’idealism’ contrasted with realism); it can also be usedmore loosely to refer simply to an evaluative
standard (‘the ideal of gender equality is better realized in Sweden than in Afghanistan’)” (Stemplowska and
Swift, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” 374). “Best case scenario” is meant to subsume the notions of perfection
and impossibility without implying them. Compare also Mills’s distinction between “ideal-as-normative”
and “ideal-as-model” (Mills, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology”).
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to evaluate options (what Hamlin and Stemplowska call a “theory of ideals”9), whereas
a best case ideal theory characterizes and explains the defining attributes of a best case
scenario. To illustrate this distinction, take Rawls’s ideal theory, which consists of three
principles. The first states that each member of society is to have an adequate set of
civil and political liberties consistent with everyone having the same set of liberties (the
“equal basic liberties principle”); the second states that each member of society is to have
effectively equal chances to occupy the social positions to which shares of socioeconomic
goods are to be attached (the “fair equality of opportunity principle”); the third says that
socioeconomic inequalities are to be arranged so as to maximize the share of the worst
off position in society (the “difference principle”).10 The first principle is “lexically prior”
to the second principle; the second principle is “lexically prior” to the third. Given these
priority rules, we could take Rawls’s principles to characterize a standard by which to
evaluate options: we rank possible institutional schemes in terms of the extent to which
they provide equal basic liberties and equal opportunities to occupy social positions, and
the extent to which they maximize the socioeconomic goods of the least advantaged.11
Or we could take these principles to characterize certain defining attributes of a fully or
perfectly just society: a perfectly just society is one that realizes the properties picked out
by Rawls’s three principles.12 We don’t need to decide the correct reading of Rawls here.
The point is only that we can sensibly read an ideal theory such as Rawls’s as indicating a
set of criteria for evaluating options from the perspective of justice or as characterizing a
fully just option.
With this distinction in hand, we can identify two formulations of the ideal theorist’s
defense:
(1) An evaluative ideal theory—a theory that characterizes criteria for evaluating options
from an appropriately normative perspective—can provide useful information for
specifying an evaluative standard.
9. Alan Hamlin and Zofia Stemplowska, “Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals,” Political Studies
Review 10 (2012): 48–62.
10. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2001), 42–3.
11. Cf. Martijn Boot, “The Aim of a Theory of Justice,” Ethical Theory andMoral Practice 15 (2012): 7–21;
Hamlin and Stemplowska, “Theory, Ideal Theory and the Theory of Ideals”; Andrea Sangiovanni, “Normative
Political Theory: A Flight From Reality?” In Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a
Realist Theme, ed. Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 219–239.
12. Cf. Robeyns, “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice”; Sen, The Idea of Justice; Simmons, “Ideal and
Nonideal Theory.”
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(2) A best case ideal theory—a theory that characterizes the defining attributes of a nor-
matively ideal option—can provide useful information for specifying an evaluative
standard.
Stated this way, we can readily see that (1) is tautological. An evaluative standard, as
we’ve defined that notion, just is a theory of the criteria we should use to comparatively
evaluate options and their relative importance in such comparisons. It is uninformative
to claim that ideal theory understood as a theory of evaluative criteria can help specify
an evaluative standard. It is thus unreasonable to think that political philosophers have
the evaluative sense of “ideal theory” in mind when they claim that it can contribute to
the task of comparative evaluation. In examining the ideal theorist’s defense, we must be
addressing the claim that a description of a normatively ideal society can help us specify
an evaluative standard. From now on, we focus our attention on claim (2).
Turning our attention to the ambiguity of “evaluative standard”, recall our distinction
between pure comparative principles and benchmark comparative principles. The key
difference is that pure comparative principles can be specified without appeal to a privi-
leged reference option, while benchmark principles must appeal to a reference option.
Since an evaluative standard is just a comprehensive principle of comparative evaluation,
we should distinguish between benchmark standards and pure comparative standards.
Claim (2) can thus be formulated in two ways:
(2a) A best case ideal theory can provide useful information for specifying a benchmark
standard.
(2b) A best case ideal theory can provide useful information for specifying a pure com-
parative standard.
I challenge the practical significance of (2a) in the next section and (2b) in section 4.
3. BEST CASE IDEALS AND BENCHMARK STANDARDS
Claim (2a) might seem obviously true. Since benchmark standards compare options in
terms of their relative similarity to a reference option, such standards straightforwardly
create a role for a best case ideal theory: they comparatively evaluate all options in terms
of their relative similarity to a non-comparatively determined ideal. Obviously, if we are
going to evaluate options in terms of their relative similarity to a normatively ideal sce-
nario, wemust know the defining attributes of that scenario. Thus, a best case ideal theory
certainly provides useful— indeed, necessary— information for specifying a benchmark
7
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standard. Moreover, claim (2a) might seem to have obvious practical significance. As
Rawls claims, for example, we can plausibly rank injustices as more or less urgent in terms
of “the extent of their deviation from perfect justice.”13 Such a ranking in turn allows us to
identify priorities among feasible solutions to real-world problems, even if much of this
ranking is “left importantly to intuition.”14
Somemight look to Amartya Sen’s arguments against “transcendental ideals” to chal-
lenge the practical relevance of benchmark standards. Most prominently, Sen argues that
transcendental ideals—descriptions of perfectly just societies—are neither necessary
nor sufficient for comparatively evaluating feasible options. The details of these argu-
ments and their deficiencies don’t matter here.15 Suffice it to say that, even if successful,
neither argument gives us a reason to disregard benchmark standards. The argument
against the necessity of ideals merely points out that it is possible to make comparative
judgments without a benchmark—that a pure comparative standard is sufficient for
comparative evaluations. This leaves open the possibility that benchmark standards
are at least as good as pure comparative standards when it comes to evaluating feasible
options. The argument against sufficiency indicates that a best case ideal theory is not
enough to construct a benchmark standard—that we must, in addition, theorize the
dimensions required to measure relative similarity. But that leaves untouched the claim
that a best case ideal is a necessary reference point from which to measure deviations,
and, in any case, it’s no argument against using benchmark standards.
Sen alludes to a stronger argument against benchmark standards when he says that
“descriptive closeness is not necessarily a guide to valuational proximity”.16 He illustrates
the point using a simple example: “a person who prefers red wine to white may prefer
either to a mixture of the two, even though the mixture is, in an obvious descriptive sense,
13. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 216.
14. ibid. Stemplowska and Swift elaborate on this “urgency role” of ideal theory and note some of its
limitations (Zofia Stemplowska and Adam Swift, “Rawls on Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” in A Companion to
Rawls, ed. JonMandle and David A. Reidy [Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2014], 117, 120–21). Recall (from
footnote 3) that we are focusing on the potential use of benchmark standards to evaluate social possibilities
apart from their role in assessing which social possibilities lie along a path that is most likely to realize the
ideal. The latter role raises its own set of complications that cannot be adequately addressed within the scope
of this article.
15. See Sen, The Idea of Justice, esp. 98–102. For valuable criticisms of Sen on these points, see, among
others, Pablo Gilabert, “Comparative Assessments of Justice, Political Feasibility, and Ideal Theory,” Ethical
Theory &Moral Practice 15, no. 1 (2012): 39–56; Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory”; Zofia Stemplowska,
“Sen’s Modest Justice,” Jurisprudence 5, no. 2 (2015): 376–384; Adam Swift, “The Value of Philosophy in
Nonideal Circumstances,” Social Theory and Practice 34, no. 3 (2008): 363–387; Laura Valentini, “A Paradigm
Shift in Theorizing About Justice? A Critique of Sen,” Economics and Philosophy 27 (2011): 297–315.
16. Sen, The Idea of Justice, 16.
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closer to the preferred red wine than pure white wine would be”.17 The argument is
roughly this: Suppose we can compare our options using two different measures: one
is a measure of descriptive similarity among our options (e.g., the color of the wine),
and the other is a measure of the comparative value of our options (e.g., a person’s wine
tastes or preferences). Suppose, also, that there are some restrictions on which options
we can choose such that the option with the highest comparative value is unavailable to
us (call this option “the unavailable ideal” for convenience). Given these assumptions, if
we wish to choose the remaining available option with the highest comparative value,
then we should hesitate to choose the option that is most descriptively similar to the
unavailable ideal. In many cases, our twomeasures will diverge from each other—the
ordering of options according to comparative value will not match the ordering of options
according to their similarity to the unavailable ideal—and, in some cases, this divergence
will be quite radical. Given this divergence, our measure of descriptive similarity will be a
misleading guide for our choice, since our stipulated aim is to choose the available option
with the highest comparative value. All this suggests that we should disregard benchmark
standards as a misleading guide to comparative value.18
Sen’s wine example might be suggestive, but ideal theorists typically find it unpersua-
sive because the measure of descriptive similarity tracks an attribute with little normative
significance. As Pablo Gilabert points out, instead of color, it’s more sensible to evaluate
deviations from the ideal with respect to a less superficial attribute, such as consistency
of taste, in which case the white wine is, descriptively speaking, closer to the red wine
than the mix.19 Generalizing this point, ideal normative theories depart from Sen’s wine
example in describing options, and thus measuring descriptive similarity among options,
in terms of the “values that underlie” options’ superficial attributes.20 We might plausibly
think, then, that in cases where both measures—descriptive similarity and comparative
17. ibid. See also Goodin’s familiar case in which a person compares cars with respect to color, model, and
model year and finds that the most preferred car short of the ideal might not look anything like the ideal car
(Robert E. Goodin, “Political Ideals and Political Practice,” British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 1 [1995]:
53).
18. This argument loosely resembles Lipsey and Lancaster’s “general theory of second best” (R.G. Lipsey
and Kelvin Lancaster, “The General Theory of Second Best,” The Review of Economic Studies 24, no. 1 [1956]:
11–32). Strict application of the theorem requires exploring numerous technical complications that do not
bear on our discussion here. Hence, I set aside a more detailed discussion of the theory of second best.
19. Gilabert, “Comparative Assessments of Justice,” 46.
20. Swift, “The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances,” 376–377. Compare Goodin’s conclusion
regarding the lessons to be learned from his car case (see footnote 17): the type of problem exemplified by the
car case “arise[s] particularly when descriptions are couched in terms of surface attributes rather than more




value—track the same normatively salient attributes, we have little reason to worry that
a measure of descriptive similarity will mislead with respect to comparative value.
But this conclusion is too quick. Even if our measures of descriptive similarity and
comparative value track changes in the exact same normatively significant attributes,
they can plausibly do so in different ways. Once we clearly see how this divergence can
arise in a relatively ordinary case of normative reasoning, we should be persuaded to
disregard benchmark standards as misleading guides for comparative evaluation. To
this end, imagine we are evaluating possible social arrangements (“societies”) with the
eventual aim of choosing the best overall feasible solution to some real-world problem.
Let’s assume that we describe possible societies in terms of two normatively significant
criteria: equality and freedom; to simplify the exposition, suppose that these criteria
exhaust our normative concerns. Tomake things concrete yet simple, suppose we use two
variables, denoted e and f respectively, to measure the extent to which possible societies
realize our two criteria. We treat each variable as a continuous measure ranging from 0
(complete absence) to 1 (full realization).
To assess the claim that a benchmark standard can be a good guide to comparative
value, we must identify the ideal society within our set of possible societies, which we
can then use as a reference point for constructing a benchmark standard. Suppose, then,
that we identify the ideal society with the society that has the best composition judged
directly in terms of the extent to which it realizes our two criteria; as shorthand, we
say it is the society we judge to have the highest overall normative value. To make our
judgments about overall normative value precise, let’s assume that these judgments can
be represented by a function of our two criteria (i.e., our function ranks one possible
society higher than another if and only if the first is judged by us to have higher overall
normative value than the second). For simplicity, we assume that, according to our
judgments, the overall value of a society increases as the realization of each criterion
increases. We also assume (without loss of generality) that our evaluative judgments place
slightly greater weight on equality relative to freedom. For concreteness, let’s represent
these judgments using the following value function:
V (e, f ) = 3e +2 f .
The key feature of this function for our purposes is that it attends directly to the ways
in which our specified normative criteria contribute to the overall value of possible
societies.21
21. Although we choose a specific functional form, wemake no normative claims here. In particular, we
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Since our value function implies that overall normative value increases as we increase
the realization of equality and freedom, it should be clear that the ideal society is one
that fully realizes equality and freedom (see the appendix for details). We can think
of the ideal society as being characterized by normative principles that characterize
the ideal levels of our criteria (e = 1 and f = 1). While typical ideal-theoretic principles
are not mathematically precise, these principles are functionally analogous to more
familiar principles such as “Every citizen’s basic needs should be satisfied” or “Freedom
of association should be effectively guaranteed for all citizens”.
Having characterized the ideal society, we can turn to the task of specifying a bench-
mark standard, which ranks possible societies according to their relative (descriptive)
similarity to the ideal. One intuitive measure of similarity is to count the number of ideal
principles a society satisfies: if one society satisfies more ideal principles than another
society, then this measure would score the first as more similar to the ideal than the
second.22 While counting the number of ideal principles satisfied is an intuitive measure
of descriptive similarity, it can only deliver very course-grained judgments. For any ideal
principle, a society does or does not satisfy it, so possibilities can only be placed in a small
number of “similarity groups” according to the number of ideal principles each satis-
fies. For example, in the case under consideration here, this similarity measure implies
that a very large number of possible societies short of the ideal are equally similar: all
societies at which e = 1 and all societies at which f = 1. Wemight refine these similarity
judgments by setting priorities among the principles. For example, suppose we deem the
freedom-regarding principle as more important (for the purposes of measuring descrip-
tive similarity) than the equality-regarding principle. Then we arrive at a slightly more
refined similarity ranking:
(1) All societies at which f = 1 and e ≠ 1 (most similar)
(2) All societies at which e = 1 and f ≠ 1
do not claim that this is the only, or even the most plausible, function for determining the overall value of
possible societies. Normatively speaking, the most plausible value functions would likely be more complex
than this one. What’s important (for expository purposes) is that this function is simple enough (while
remaining independently plausible) to capture the idea that our comparative value judgments reflect the
differing normative significance of our two criteria. In an appendix, I discuss why it is important that this
function represents our comparative value judgments as being continuous in equality and freedom.
22. This is distinct from the idea—which I consider below as the “strong version of claim (2b)”—that
we use the content of ideal principles to produce a comparative ranking of possibilities; e.g., that we rank
societies by the extent to which they guarantee freedom of association for all citizens. The measure we are
considering in the text only allows binary judgments: a society satisfies a principle or it does not.
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(3) All societies at which e ≠ 1 and f ≠ 1 (least similar)
Changing our priorities will, of course, produce different similarity judgments, but this is
sufficient to make the general point clear.
Without denying that we might sensibly use these kinds of “principle-counting”
measures to judge descriptive similarity to the ideal, our use of continuous variables
to indicate the realization of equality and freedom allows us to definemuchmore fine-
grained similarity measures. To see this, first notice that our variables allow us to think
of possible societies as being described by coordinates in a two-dimensional space with
our two variables defining these dimensions. For example, if we let our equality variable
define the x-axis and our freedom variable define the y-axis, then our ideal society is
located at the point corresponding to the coordinates (1,1). Other possible societies are
located at other coordinates within this space. Given this spatial way of thinking about our
set of possible societies, we can use the mathematical notion of a distance metric to think
about descriptive similarity in a fine-grained way. The standard distance metric for the
kind of two-dimensional space we are operating with here is the Euclidean metric, which
measures the length of a straight line drawn between any two points within our space.23
The relative length of straight lines between points provides, in turn, a straightforward
measure of descriptive similarity: two points are (descriptively) similar to each other to
the extent that they are (spatially) close to each other. To make this idea concrete (see
figure 1), take two points a and b and let a third point c be our reference point. If the line
between a and c is shorter than the line between b and c, then we can sensibly conclude
that a is more similar to c than b is to c ; by the same token, a and b will be judged equally
similar to c if (and only if) a and b are equidistant from c.
Recall that we are ultimately interested here in assessing whether benchmark stan-
dards are a reliable guide to judgments of comparative normative value. In particular,
we want to know whether, when choosing among nonideal societies, we would do best
(normatively speaking) by choosing the nonideal society that is most similar to the ideal,
as theorists sometimes claim in defense of the practical value of ideal theory.24 To assess
this hypothesis, we must introduce a feasibility constraint into our thought experiment
and then consider whether a measure of descriptive similarity to the ideal would guide
23. Mathematically, the Euclidean distance from the ideal is defined as￿(e −e∗)2+( f − f ∗)2,
where (e∗, f ∗) are the coordinates of the ideal. I discuss other possible distance metrics in the appendix,
although my conclusions in the text do not depend on the choice of metric so far as I can tell.
24. See, e.g., Gilabert, “Comparative Assessments of Justice,” 243; Valentini, “A Paradigm Shift?” 42.
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Figure 1. Illustrating Euclidean distance
our choice among feasible societies in accordance with our comparative value judgments.
To this end, let’s assume that it is feasible to fully realize either freedom or equality but
not both simultaneously. To make things more concrete, let’s also assume that, at the
outer limit of the feasible set, increasing the realization of one criterion requires us to
sacrifice some amount of the other criterion. Specifically, let’s assume that these “oppor-
tunity costs” satisfy the following condition: starting from full freedom, small decreases
in freedom bring large gains in equality, but as we approach full equality, small increases
in equality require increasingly large decreases in freedom. We can make this idea precise
by saying that all possible societies (e, f ) such that f +e2 ≤ 1 are feasible.
Given our assumptions, we can use standardmathematical techniques (see appendix)
to show that the most valuable nonideal society—the feasible society that maximizes
overall normative value according to our evaluative judgments (i.e., the function V )— is
one that realizes equality and freedom at the following levels: e = 0.75 and f ≈ 0.44. We
can think of these features as being prescribed by “nonideal” normative principles, akin
to a more familiar principle such as “If we cannot satisfy every citizen’s basic needs, then
we should at least protect them against threats to physical integrity”.
Having characterized the most valuable feasible society, we now consider whether
one of our measures of descriptive similarity to the ideal can sensibly guide our choice
among feasible societies in accordance with our comparative value judgments. Starting
with the crudest similarity measure, if we simply count up the number of principles
satisfied by feasible societies, then all feasible societies at which one ideal principle is
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satisfied would register asmost similar to the ideal. Since our feasibility constraint implies
that f = 0 when e = 1 and vice versa, our simple principle-counting similarity measure
implies that the feasible societies most similar to the ideal are those at which either e = 1
and f = 0 or f = 1 and e = 0. If we refine this measure by, for example, prioritizing the
freedom-regarding principle, then a society at which f = 1 and e = 0 is most similar to
the ideal. Clearly, taking guidance from these “principle-counting” benchmark standard
would mislead us to pursue a society that, while identical to the ideal in at least one
respect, drastically under provides either freedom or equality relative to themost valuable
nonideal society as identified by our judgments of overall normative value.
We see similar (although less drastic) deviations when we turn to more fine-grained
(mathematical) measures of similarity (see the appendix for technical details). If we use
the Euclideanmetric to identify themost similar nonideal society—the feasible society
that is most similar to the ideal— then we pick out the society at which e ≈ 0.59 and
f ≈ 0.65. So the most similar society deviates from the ideal along both dimensions. More
important for our purposes, however, is the fact that, when compared to themost valuable
nonideal society (e = 0.75, f ≈ 0.44), themost similar nonideal society reverses the priority
given to our two criteria. Similar results hold for other candidate distance metrics— in
any case, following a more fine-grained benchmark standard would mislead us to pursue
a feasible solution to our nonideal circumstances that under provides equality and over
provides freedom relative to the feasible society with the highest overall normative value.
The lesson to take away from the foregoing thought experiment is the lesson Sen
draws from his wine example: descriptive similarity is not necessarily a good guide to
comparative normative value. Stated generally, that’s a simple insight, one that can often
be demonstrated using simple cases.25 One might wonder, then, why I have bothered
to construct such an elaborate thought experiment—one involving mathematics, no
less— to demonstrate the point. But recall that the simple cases typically used to establish
Sen’s lesson measure descriptive similarity using normatively insignificant attributes
and thus fail to persuade ideal theorists to disregard claim (2a) as practically irrelevant.
Our thought experiment improves upon the simple cases by showing how descriptive
similarity and comparative value can diverge where wemight least expect it—namely,
when descriptive similarity and comparative value are both measured using the same
normatively significant criteria, and comparative value is a continuous function of these
criteria (i.e., small changes in the attributes picked out by our criteria produce small
changes in comparative value). Our case makes clear the following insight: while mea-
25. Cf. David Estlund, Utopophobia: On the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, Forthcoming), 261.
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sures of similarity and comparative value converge at the ideal, focusing unduly on this
convergence obscures the fact that they diverge in their judgments regarding nonideal
options. Given this divergence when ranking deviations from the ideal, we should hesitate
to evaluate nonideal societies in terms of descriptive similarity to an ideal instead of
directly in terms of their comparative value. Claim (2a) is surely true, but we should
disregard it as practically irrelevant.26
Two objections arise here. The first argues that our thought experiment describes
a highly unusual case of normative reasoning. If that’s right, then we’ve left open the
possibility that benchmark standards are perfectly good guides to comparative value in
standard cases of normative reasoning, and we have not yet shown that we should disre-
gard benchmark standards in general. The second objection argues that the conclusion of
our thought experiment turns on the fact that comparative value is defined independent
of descriptive similarity. If, instead, we define comparative value directly in terms of
descriptive similarity to the ideal, then the divergence observed in our case would not
arise and benchmark standards would, in turn, retain practical significance. I consider
these in turn.
In reply to the first objection, I note that our conclusions turn on the following features
of our thought experiment, which are perfectly ordinary features of normative reasoning:
• The specified descriptive similarity judgments track the extent to which a possible
society realizes attributes picked out by normative criteria—which we might call
“values”—but, being descriptive rather than normative judgments, they bracket
the ways in which these criteria contribute to a society’s normative value.
• The specified comparative value judgments (represented by the function V )
directly track the extent to which the specified criteria contribute to the overall
normative value of a possible society.
• The specified value judgments reflect the thought that different criteria can have
differing normative significance when measuring options’ overall normative
value.
The second and third features, while not universally shared, are nonetheless familiar
features of normative reasoning. The first feature might be less familiar, but that’s be-
cause it is often left obscure in our normative reasoning, turning as it does on a subtle
26. In an appendix, I show why the particular example discussed here is not a special case that was “cherry-
picked” to support this skeptical conclusion.
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distinction. To make this subtlety determinate and thereby enable us to reason clearly
about its implications, we depart from ordinary normative reasoning by introducing
the simplification of mathematical precision. But our conclusions do not turn on this
difference in precision, so there’s nothing preventing us from generalizing our conclusions
to less precise forms of normative reasoning that share these three features.27
Turning to the second objection, my concern is that it settles the question of ideal
theory’s practical relevance by definitional fiat. Defining the general notion of compara-
tive value without reference to any notion of descriptive similarity has two advantages.
The first is that it allows us to analytically distinguish normative judgments from de-
scriptive judgments, which seems desirable even if only to maintain good conceptual
housekeeping. The second is that it leaves it open as a genuine question whether descrip-
tive similarity is a good guide to comparative evaluation. Many philosophers would be
surprised, I think, to discover that this issue is readily resolved simply by attending to the
definition of the notion of comparative value, thus sapping it of its apparent philosophical
interest. In any case, simply defining the notion of comparative value tomean “descriptive
similarity to an ideal” risks seeming ad hoc if this is introduced solely as a way to salvage
the practical relevance of benchmark evaluative standards.28
4. BEST CASE IDEALS AND PURE COMPARATIVE STANDARDS
If the practical value of ideal theory is to be linked to its contribution to our comparative
evaluation of possible social arrangements, then my argument in the previous section
leaves us with claim (2b) as the only viable defense of ideal theory.
(2b) A best case ideal theory can provide useful information for specifying a pure com-
parative standard.
There is a stronger and a weaker version of this claim. The stronger version says that the
normative principles that characterize the defining attributes of an ideal society double
27. I present a more technical reply to this objection in an appendix.
28. David Estlund has argued that “a systematic theory of. . . the standard of full justice [. . . ] would be an
important resource in developing a rich account of comparative judgments” (David Estlund, “Just and Juster,”
in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, ed. David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall, vol. 2 [New
York: Oxford University Press, 2016], 11). Somemight take this to support an independent case for defining
comparative value to mean “descriptive similarity to an ideal benchmark”. Estlund’s argument is relevant
here, but to discuss it adequately, we must take up several issues that are slightly to the side of, and thus
risk distracting from, the main thread of this section. Given space constraints, I relegate my discussion of
Estlund’s argument to an appendix.
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as a pure comparative standard. On this version, principles that characterize a best case
ideal constitute a pure comparative standard. The weaker version says that characterizing
the defining attributes of an ideal society helps to expose the criteria we should use to
construct our pure comparative standard and to weigh their relative significance. On this
version, analyzing a best case ideal is epistemically useful for specifying pure comparative
principles.
To make this distinction between the two versions concrete, consider again Rawls’s
three principles. According to the stronger version of (2b), Rawls’s principles serve to
comparatively rank feasible social arrangements from the standpoint of justice.29 This
view of Rawls’s principles is made plausible by the fact that they straightforwardly imply a
(rough) ranking of possible social arrangements: options that satisfy all three principles
are best; those that satisfy solely the equal basic liberties principle and equality of oppor-
tunity principle are ranked second; those that satisfy solely the liberties principles and the
difference principle are ranked third; those that satisfy solely the liberties principle rank
fourth, and so on.30 According to the weaker version of (2b), we do not necessarily rank
feasible societies in accordance with Rawls’s principles, but his characterization of an
ideally just society exposes the criteria that a pure comparative standard should account
for—namely, the distribution of basic liberties, the distribution of opportunities, and the
extent to which the distribution of socioeconomic goods is reciprocally beneficial.31
In this section, I aim to show that, on either interpretation, claim (2b) is plausibly true
yet insufficient to vindicate the purported practical value of ideal theory. To preview, I will
show that analyzing best case ideals can help us comparatively evaluate ideal possibilities
but that they also distort our evaluation of nonideal possibilities. The first part of this
conclusion is enough to show that claim (2b) is true since a comprehensive evaluative
standard must rank ideal possibilities; the second part shows that the manner in which
this truth is secured weakens (2b) as a basis for concluding that ideal theory can help us
evaluate feasible solutions to real-world problems.
My argument is buttressed by a view of the conventional method by which we identify
a best case ideal’s defining attributes. The key point is that we typically use a restricted
29. E.g., Boot, “The Aim of a Theory of Justice”; Hamlin and Stemplowska, “Theory, Ideal Theory and the
Theory of Ideals”; Sangiovanni, “Normative Political Theory.”
30. “The lexical ranking of the principles specifies which elements of the ideal are relatively more urgent,
and the priority rules this ordering suggests are to be applied to nonideal cases as well” (Rawls, A Theory of
Justice, 216).
31. E.g., Gilabert, “Comparative Assessments of Justice”; Richard North, “Principles as Guides: The Action-
Guiding Role of Justice in Politics,” The Journal of Politics 79, no. 1 (2017): 75–88; Zofia Stemplowska,
“What’s Ideal About Ideal Theory?” Social Theory and Practice 34, no. 3 (2008): 319–340; Swift, “The Value of
Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances.”
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form of comparative evaluation to identify the attributes of best case ideals, a form of
reasoning that is similar in logical structure to the hypothetical case we explored in the
previous section. To uncover and isolate the salient features of this conventional method
and thereby facilitate the exposition of my argument, I first introduce and discuss an
analogous case.
4.1. Identifying the ideal meal: An analogy. Imagine we (you and I) wish to identify
the defining attributes of your ideal meal. Let’s be clear about our task: we aim to identify
not simply a particular meal option, but something more general—namely, the attributes
of ameal that explain why some particular combination of ingredients, which are brought
together by some particular mode of preparation, constitutes your ideal meal. We want to
identify, for example, the flavor profile (i.e., the combination of characteristics such as
salty, sweet, fruity, pungent, and nutty) or textural properties (e.g., chewy, creamy, crispy)
that you findmost desirable.
Our first task is to narrow down the very large number of possibilities to a smallish
number of contenders for the ideal. Let’s start by having you taste numerous meals,
rating each on a scale from 1 (worst) to 10 (best). Importantly, for this to work, you must
try a wide variety of meals, including options you have never tried before. So we set no
constraints on the types of meals you are to taste: no meal is too expensive or too exotic,
and our expert chef satisfies every request (set aside where we got the money to run
these trials). Since we are trying to discover your ideal meal, we want to ensure (as far as
possible) that your ratings are responding to various attributes of each meal and not to
the circumstances in which you tasted the meal, especially if those circumstances hinder
you from attending carefully to each meal’s attributes. To this end, prior to each trial, we
ensure that you are not overly hungry and we correct any nutritional deficits you may
have (e.g., a vitamin or mineral deficiency). We also ensure that you have ample time to
participate in the tasting.
Throughout the initial rating phase, we collect data on various attributes of the meals
you try: their flavor profile, their textural and nutritional properties, and so on. Once we
have collected enough data, we can correlate your ratings with meal attributes. Using
these correlations, we can exclude meals with certain attributes from further considera-
tion (e.g., perhaps you tend to dislike meals involving creamy sauces or pungent spices)
and restrict our attention to options that share the attributes of your most highly rated
meals. In this way, we can define a set of plausible contenders for the ideal. Notice that
we are not simply restricting our attention to the highest rated meals, but to the meals
that share the attributes of the highest rated meals, which includes options you have not
yet tried.
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Unless we have narrowed our attention to a single option, the remaining contenders
for the ideal will vary in their defining attributes, although they will do so within certain
bounds. To identify the defining attributes of your ideal meal, we now move to the
second phase of our enterprise. Each evening, we have you taste two randomly chosen
options from the set of contenders, after which you indicate which of the two options you
prefer. We continue this procedure until you have expressed a preference for each pair of
contendermeals. The end result of this process is a complete ordinal ranking of contender
meal options (assuming that your preferences are transitive). Your ideal meal is simply
the most preferred among the contenders. Since we have been measuring and collecting
data on meal attributes throughout our process, our process enables us to identify the
defining attributes of your ideal meal (e.g., that your ideal meal has a particular ratio of
sweet flavors to salty flavors).
I submit that the conventional method by which political theorists identify best case
ideals is relevantly analogous to the procedure outlined above, although it is beyond the
scope of this paper to fully defend this claim. My focus here is on using this analogy to
think about the role of best case ideals in our efforts to construct a pure comparative
standard for evaluating social possibilities. Before we move on with this task, however, I
briefly explicate the analogy using Rawls’s familiar ideal theory.32
Consider Rawls’s argument that his three principles define an ideally just society.
The centerpiece of Rawls’s method is the construction of a perspective from which to
make comparative judgments about various social possibilities. This “original position”
is meant to be an “expository device” that summarizes our convictions about which
kinds of reasons properly bear on our normative assessment of social arrangements.33
Once we are satisfied that the original position defines an appropriate perspective from
which to make normative judgments, we set about comparing conceptions of justice
drawn from a “definite list of traditional conceptions” from that perspective.34 This list
represents an effort to narrow the set of candidates for a conception of ideal justice. It
includes conceptions that share certain attributes: they satisfy certain formal conditions
such as universality and generality; they are relatively straightforward to understand and
apply; they have received broad support historically.35 We compare candidate concep-
tions by imagining what it would be like to live in societies that are “well-ordered” by
32. To show that Rawls’s theory isn’t the only one to fit the analogy, I briefly consider G.A. Cohen’s argument
for a socialist ideal (G. A. Cohen,Why Not Socialism? [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009]). I relegate
this to an appendix due to space constraints.
33. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 19.
34. ibid., 102.
35. ibid., secs. 21 and 23.
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these conceptions and estimating the extent to which such societies would enable us to
advance certain fundamental interests.36 When imagining what it would be like to live
in societies that are well-ordered by the candidate conceptions, we assume that these
societies realize these conceptions against a specific range of background circumstances,
which are supposed to be appropriate for theorizing about the ideally just society. For
example, we assume that material resources are moderately (and not extremely) scarce,
that members of society can be counted on “to understand and act in accordance with
whatever principles” are adopted as a public conception of justice, and so on.37 The
defining attributes of an ideally just society are specified by the conception of justice
that would be chosen from the perspective of the original position following a series of
pairwise comparisons of hypothetical societies that are well-ordered by conceptions on
the list.38
Let’s briefly take notice of the similarities between Rawls’s method and our procedure
for identifying your ideal meal. It is plausible to think of the original position as analogous
to our efforts to ensure that your assessments of meals were not sensitive to budget or
time constraints or nutritional deficits; both represent an effort to construct a situation
that ensures (so far as possible) that extraneous considerations will not bear on one’s
judgments. It is also plausible to think of Rawls’s list of traditional conceptions as akin
to our set of plausible contenders for the ideal meal; both represent an effort to identify
a manageable number of options for comparison. Relatedly, we can think of principles
of justice as analogous to the profile of attributes we identified with each meal; both are
general descriptions that can in principle be instantiated by multiple specific options
(societies or meals). Finally, in both cases, we use a comparative mode of reasoning to
identify the best case ideal; we can be confident that the top-ranked option in each case
is a best case ideal because our comparative judgments are (by construction) attentive
solely to the relevant sorts of considerations.
4.2. How best case ideals distort comparative evaluation. Given that our procedure
for identifying the defining attributes of your ideal meal is an apt analogy for the method
by which political theorists identify the defining attributes of an ideal society, we now
36. “The evaluation of principles must proceed in terms of the general consequences of their public
recognition and universal application, it being assumed that they will be complied with by everyone” (Rawls,
A Theory of Justice, 119). A society is “well-ordered” by a conception C just in case the following items
are common knowledge: that everyone accepts C ; that the basic structure effectively satisfies C ; and that
everyone acts in accordance withC (see, e.g., Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 8–9).
37. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 109–12, 125.
38. ibid., 104–06.
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use this analogy to show how best case ideals can distort our evaluation of nonideal
social possibilities. Returning to the meal analogy, a pure comparative standard is a set of
principles that determines and explains a comprehensive ranking of meal options as a
function of certain attributes of the options (e.g., their flavor profile, textural properties,
and so on). Now consider an analogue for claim (2b) above:
(3) A specification of the defining attributes of your ideal meal can provide useful
information for specifying a pure comparative standard for meal options.
This claim is correct so far as it goes, but close inspection of the case shows why it doesn’t
go very far.
Tomake things concrete, imagine that your ideal meal is instantiated by lightly seared
big eye tuna served with a ginger-miso sauce and wasabi paste, asian greens sautéed in
sesame seed oil, garlic, and soy sauce, and a cake of rice served slightly crispy on the
outside. Assume that we can more or less precisely measure the defining attributes of this
meal: the combination of buttery, salty, pungent, nutty, and sweet flavors and aromas
(from the tuna, miso, wasabi, sesame seed oil, and rice respectively); the combination of
textures: silky yet firm (tuna), and slightly crunchy yet chewy (the greens and the rice);
and so on. How can a specification of these attributes help us comparatively rank, say,
a hot dog versus fried chicken? The procedure by which we identified your ideal meal
involved numerous comparisons amongmeal options with diverse attributes. We can use
these comparisons to identify the attributes we should use to construct our comparative
standard and specify their relative importance. Let’s assume that this is correct: the
procedure we used to identify your ideal meal enables us to learn, for example, that an
option’s degree of spicy heat is a salient attribute and that you like spicy dishes up to a
certain point, and that within a certain range of this threshold, you like spicy dishes when
they are paired with a dish that has a cooling effect. Supposing our procedure provides all
kinds of detailed comparative information along these lines, this seems obviously useful
for specifying a pure comparative standard for evaluating meal options. But there are
two points of note here. The first is that, strictly speaking, this comparative information
comes not from a specification of the ideal’s defining attributes, but from the procedure
by which we specified the ideal’s defining attributes, which involved making comparisons
among a limited set of alternatives.
The second point of note is that the comparative information we can extract from
our procedure applies to somewhat idealized circumstances in which, for example, the
time and cost involved in preparing the meal are not constraints, you have no nutritional
deficiencies, and so on. Let’s grant that this information can help us predict which of
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two nonideal meals you would choose in similarly ideal circumstances. The relevant
issue, however, is whether this information can help us evaluate meal options in less
idealized circumstances, where time, cost, nutrition, and the like are pertinent. In such
circumstances, we should reasonably expect that extrapolating from the results of our
idealized procedure would distort our meal comparisons.
To see how this distortion can arise, let’s distinguish between two interpretations of
your meal preferences. On a narrow interpretation, to say that you prefer one meal to
another is to say that you find the taste profile of the former more desirable than the latter.
Call these your taste preferences. On a broader interpretation, to say that you prefer one to
another is to say that you are disposed to choose the former over the latter accounting
not only for your taste preferences, but also other factors that affect a meal’s desirability
(e.g., howmuch it costs or howmuch time it takes to prepare). Call these your all-things-
considered preferences. Depending on the circumstances, your all-things-considered
preferences can come apart from your taste preferences. Suppose, for instance, that we
can infer from our idealized procedure that you taste-prefer fried chicken to a hot dog,
but suppose also that the chicken costs more and takes more time to prepare. If you are
pressed for time or money, then you might well choose the hot dog over the chicken,
contrary to your taste preferences.
With this distinction in hand, let’s concede that a steady diet of ideal meals would
enable us to predict your taste preferences over suboptimal meals.39 Yet oftentimes, and
perhaps especially when we are choosing among suboptimal meals, more than taste
matters. Since our procedure for identifying the attributes of your ideal meal is designed
to bracket all considerations except those that bear on your taste preferences, we must
worry that it presents a distorted picture of a meal’s desirability when criteria beyond
your taste preferences matter. We can’t evade this worry by noting that information about
time, cost, or nutrition is readily available and can be easily incorporated with your taste
preferences to deliver reliable nonideal comparisons. Simply knowing this additional
information doesn’t yet indicate how you weigh these other criteria (time, money, health,
and so on) relative to your taste preferences.
Worse yet, a procedure that abstracts from factors such as time, cost, and the like
obscures and distorts the relative weight of the criteria that define your taste preferences.
For example, suppose that in the idealized circumstances of our procedure above, where
money is no concern, you always choose sweet options over salty options. These obser-
vations strongly suggest that you weigh sweet flavor attributes muchmore heavily than
salty flavor attributes. Now imagine we find you at a food cart for a quick snack, where
39. Cf. e.g., Stemplowska, “What’s Ideal About Ideal Theory?” 336–68.
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your options are an ice cream sundae for three dollars or a hot dog for two dollars. Ex-
trapolating from our idealized procedure, we might reasonably predict that you’ll choose
the ice cream over the hot dog. But this would be too quick, for we haven’t yet considered
the price-sensitivity of your taste preferences. When your own money is in play, you
might well choose the hot dog because you are unwilling to pay the extra dollar to satisfy
your sweet tooth. Then, given the slight price difference, we should infer that your taste
preference for sweet flavors over salty flavors is in fact very slight. The taste preferences
we derive from our idealized procedure thus exaggerate the significance of sweet flavors
relative to salty flavors. Pressing further, the design of our procedure for identifying your
ideal meal works against our efforts to reliably infer the relative significance of various
taste attributes even in the ideal case. Our procedure for identifying your ideal meal holds
constant all factors except for taste attributes so that these non-taste-related factors do
not confound the results. As a consequence, even a slight preference for sweet flavors
is sufficient to cause you to choose sweet over salty every time. To reliably detect the
relative weight you assign to (e.g.) sweet flavor attributes, we need to observe your choice
behavior under a range of circumstances that vary non-taste-attributes (time, money,
health, etc.). But then, to generate reliable information about the relative significance of
various taste attributes, our procedure would have to allow variation that confounds our
efforts to identify the meal you rank highest when taste alone is relevant (i.e., your ideal
meal).
None of the preceding implies that our original procedure is unable to characterize
the defining attributes of your ideal meal. The point is instead that we have good reasons
to think that extrapolating from the results of a procedure designed to identify your ideal
meal likely distorts our evaluation of meal options in circumstances where time, cost, and
other such factors matter.
Keeping this analogy in mind, let’s now turn our attention to the case of ideal norma-
tive theory. Recall the strong and weak versions of claim (2b):
• Strong version: The normative principles that characterize the defining attributes
of a best case ideal also serve as a pure comparative standard for evaluating
nonideal options.
• Weak version: The reasoning by which we identify the defining attributes of a
best case ideal helps to expose the criteria we should use to specify our pure
comparative standard for evaluating nonideal options.
Start by noticing that the strong version of (2b) applies solely to a subset of ideal theories,
namely, those constituted by principles that not only identify the defining attributes of a
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best case ideal but also indicate priorities among these attributes. Rawls’s ideal is of this
sort, but others, such as Cohen’s (see appendix), are not.
The challenge to using Rawls’s principles to comparatively rank nonideal options is
that it identifies priorities for the realization of certain normative criteria assuming back-
ground social conditions that are favorable for their full realization, including moderate
but not extreme scarcity and people’s general willingness to do their part in upholding a
public conception of justice. For instance, when granting the realization of basic liberties
lexical priority over the realization of equal social opportunities and greater material
welfare, Rawls assumes that the circumstances in which these principles are to be realized
“admit the effective realization of the equal liberties”, or at least that they are “sufficiently
favorable” to allow for the eventual realization of equal basic liberties.40 In other words,
the comparative ranking implied by Rawls’s ideal assumes that the realization of equal
basic liberties does not unduly impinge on the realization of equal social opportunities
or adequate material welfare.41 This specification of opportunity costs depends, in turn,
on Rawls’s idealistic assumptions about the background circumstances in which various
candidate conceptions of justice are to be realized. Were the background circumstances
to differ—e.g., were they such that the realization of equal basic liberties would impinge
greatly on the realization of adequate material welfare for all— then, in view of such
unfavorable circumstances, it’s reasonable to expect that our judgments about the relative
priority of liberty to welfare would change.
Rawls and other ideal theorists acknowledge limits on using principles derived from
ideal-theoretic comparisons to evaluate options in nonideal circumstances.42 This is
where the weak version of (2b) enters. The claim here is not that ideal principles constitute
a standard for evaluating nonideal options, but that reasoning about the ideal provides
resources for constructing a standard that is suitable to evaluating nonideal options. As
Adam Swift puts it, “as long as philosophers can tell uswhy the ideal would be ideal, and
not simply that it is, much of what they actually do when they do ‘ideal theory’ is likely to
help with the evaluation of options within the feasible set.”43 On this view, Rawls’s and
Cohen’s reasoning for their respective principles suggest criteria that our comparative
standard should incorporate, such as: differences in civil and political status among
members of society as determined by the distribution of basic liberties,44 or the extent to
40. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 132, cf. 215.
41. Cf. Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal Theory.”
42. See, e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 55, 216; cf. Stemplowska and Swift, “Rawls on Ideal and Nonideal
Theory,” 125.
43. Swift, “The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances,” 365, original emphases.
44. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 82.
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which the distribution of opportunities for advantage corrects for both social and natural
disadvantages.45
This weak version of (2b) is plausible but, in articulating its implications for com-
parative evaluation, we should take care not to underestimate the significance of ideal
theory’s limitations. In particular, we should resist what seems like a strong temptation to
treat ideal-theoretic comparisons as a more or less reliable starting point for comparative
evaluation, so long as we proceed with caution as we incorporate information about real-
world circumstances. This is because we have good reasons to suspect that extrapolating
from our ideal-theoretic comparisons systematically distorts our evaluative judgments.
Drawing on our analogy, the source of trouble is now easy to spot: by assuming conditions
that are favorable for realizing a just or democratic society, ideal-theoretic comparisons
bracket various factors that would confound our efforts to characterize the attributes
of an ideal society. This is sensible given the aim of identifying a best case ideal. Yet in
bracketing these potential confounding factors, ideal-theoretic comparisons bracket the
kind of variation required to discern the relative significance of the normative criteria
under investigation.
To make the preceding point more concrete, consider a familiar realist challenge to
Rawlsian “moralism”: because Rawls’s reasoning assumes conditions that are favorable
for realizing a system of social cooperation, it disregards what Bernard Williams calls “the
first political question”: the social challenge of “securing. . . order, security, protection,
safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation.”46 Consequently, Rawls’s comparisons of
different well-ordered societies hold constant the high-level realization of basic evaluative
criteria such as security and the rule of law. This leads Rawls to silence regarding the sig-
nificance of these criteria relative to the criteria he emphasizes, such as freedom, equality,
fairness, and reciprocity. At best, then, Rawls’s ideal provides incomplete guidance when
we evaluate candidate solutions to the problems of securing and maintaining peace,
order, and the rule of law.47
What’s worse, by bracketing the costs associated with realizing these basic conditions
for social cooperation, Rawls’s ideal risks distorting the relative significance of (e.g.) equal
political status, equal opportunities, and material equality. To see how this distortion
can arise, suppose we are comparing two (hypothetical) oil-rich societies marked by a
45. Cohen,Why Not Socialism? , 14–9.
46. Bernard Williams, In The Beginning Was The Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument, ed.
Geoffrey Hawthorn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 3.
47. In a similar vein, Charles Mills criticizes ideal theory for “abstract[ing] away from relations of struc-




history of ethnic conflict: one is a dictatorship, the other is a democracy. To give texture
to the comparison, let’s make the following assumptions. Starting with the dictatorship,
we assume that it coercively restricts basic political liberties (such as the freedom to vote
or freedom of political dissent) to suppress political challenges that threaten to unleash
ethnic violence; to avoid widespread popular discontent, which could destabilize the situ-
ation, the dictatorship uses oil revenue to provide households with socioeconomic goods
such as decent housing, education, health care, and so on. As a result, the dictatorship
realizes a tense yet moderately stable security situation, a low level of political freedom,
and a moderately high level of socioeconomic welfare. Turning to the democracy, we
assume that citizens have a high level of civil and political freedom (e.g., freedom to vote,
freedom of association, freedom of protest and dissent), but that democratic politics is lit-
tle more than a naked competition for control over the available oil revenue, in which rival
ethnic factions take turns using this revenue for the exclusive benefit of their ethnic kin.
Compared to the dictatorship, the democracy has a slightly less stable security situation
(sustains a slightly higher risk of violent ethnic conflict), a much higher level of political
freedom, and a notably lower level of material welfare (although all citizens remain above
a decent minimum). Our question concerns how to rank these two societies: which
society is normatively superior?48
Were we to use Rawls’s ideal principles to comparatively evaluate these two soci-
eties— the strong version of (2b)—wewould straightforwardly rank the democracy above
the dictatorship in virtue of its superior realization of political freedom. Many ideal
theorists will acknowledge that this judgment, while not necessarily incorrect, is too
quick. So suppose we proceed more cautiously, using Rawls’s ideal only as a way to focus
our attention on important evaluative criteria. How, exactly, does Rawls’s ideal help us
comparatively rank these two societies? Following the weak version of (2b), we might say
that it helps us identify political freedom and the distribution of socioeconomic goods as
important criteria. But that’s too strong—surely our comparison wouldn’t ignore these
criteria but for knowledge of Rawls’s ideal. We might strengthen the initial thought by say-
ing that Rawls’s ideal helps us realize that our comparison should treat political freedom
and the distribution of socioeconomic goods as especially weighty. But this is too quick. In
the first place, Rawls’s ideal has nothing to say about the significance of political freedom
48. Recall (from footnote 3) that our question is not: Which arrangements would put an oil-rich but
ethnically-fragmented society on a path that is more likely to achieve the ideal? Addressing this “target-
oriented” way of evaluating nonideal societies is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that, if my
arguments in this paper are persuasive, then the only way to salvage the claim that ideal theory helps us
comparatively evaluate nonideal societies requires one to defend the controversial claim that our political
reform efforts should aim for the best case ideal.
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and socioeconomic welfare relative to the security criterion. Moreover, we should hesitate
to infer from Rawls’s ideal that political freedom is especially weighty relative to the distri-
bution of socioeconomic goods. Because Rawls compares “well-ordered” societies, he
assumes a uniformly stable security situation and, thus, his reasoning neglects to consider
the “price-sensitivity” of our normative preference for political liberties over socioeco-
nomic welfare—that is, our willingness to give up somemeasure of security to change
the relative balance of political freedom and socioeconomic welfare. (This is analogous to
our willingness to give up somemoney to change the relative balance of sweet flavors and
salty flavors.) It’s hardly implausible that a nonideal theory for circumstances involving a
credible risk of violent ethnic conflict would conclude that our normative priority should
be to stabilize the security situation and minimize the risk of violent ethnic conflict, even
if this implies giving up a significant measure of political freedom. Let’s suppose (for the
sake of illustration) that this is correct. Then taking Rawls’s ideal as a starting point for
comparative evaluation would risk distorting our sense of political freedom’s significance
relative to other criteria and, in turn, our comparative evaluation of these two societies.
We can’t know, of course, whether extrapolating from Rawls’s ideal would prevent us from
arriving at the correct ranking; for this, we’d need to know the correct ranking and be able
to corroborate it without reference to the ideal. But my point isn’t that extrapolating from
a best case ideal can be known to produce incorrect evaluative judgments. It’s rather that
extrapolating from the ideal poses a known risk of distorting our evaluative judgments in
the ways outlined here.
David Estlund’s remarks about using justice partitions to make “eyeball comparisons”
suggest an intriguing rejoinder here.49 The basic idea is that we might use the best case
ideal to calibrate our evaluation of nonideal societies and thereby indirectly rank them.
To fix ideas, suppose we find it tough to rank our two nonideal societies in a head-to-head
comparison (perhaps they are too different from each other along too many dimensions
to allow direct comparisons). Wemight instead compare each nonideal society to the best
case ideal. In so doing, we will of course perceive a “justice gap” between each nonideal
society and the ideal. But suppose further that these comparisons to the ideal enable us
to perceive that the justice gap between the ideal and the dictatorship is notably larger
than the justice gap between the ideal and the nonideal democracy. This exercise thus
indirectly generates a comparative ranking of the two nonideal societies: the democracy
is less unjust than the dictatorship.
While this indirect method of comparing nonideal options seems plausible at a
glance, careful inspection of how it might work shows that it likely collapses to one of two
49. Estlund, “Just and Juster.”
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approaches, each of which faces challenges I’ve already discussed. The first possibility
is that it implicitly evaluates nonideal options by their relative descriptive similarity to
the ideal. To wit, our (hypothetical) judgment that the justice gap between the nonideal
democracy and the ideal is smaller than the justice gap between the dictatorship and
the ideal is plausibly explained by the fact that the democracy, but not the dictatorship,
resembles the ideal in a highly salient respect—namely, both are liberal democracies.
But this is just to take descriptive similarity as a guide to comparative evaluation, and
we’ve already seen how this can be misleading. The second possibility is that we use
the ideal to focus our attention on the criteria that we think are especially important
for comparing social possibilities; thus, comparing each nonideal society to the ideal
sharpens our perception of the relative shortfall between different nonideal societies and
the ideal. But this seems like nothing but a sophisticated way of saying that the ideal
helps us identify especially weighty normative criteria, so it’s hard to see how this indirect
comparativemethod avoids the concerns I’ve already raised about the potential distorting
effects of extrapolating from ideal theory.
My arguments to this point notwithstanding, I think there’s still something to be said
for ideal theory in connection with comparative evaluation, namely, that it can help us to
clarify the criteria we use to comparatively rank social possibilities. But since I want to
use this thought to shift our perspective on how ideal theory contributes to comparative
evaluation, I set it aside momentarily. To conclude this section, then, let’s be clear that
nothing I have said disqualifies Rawls’s (or anyone else’s) ideal theory from serving as
a theory of a best case ideal. For all I have said here, proper reasoning about the ideal
society might require us to bracket many salient features of real-world politics.50 The
lesson to take from this section is instead this: When it comes to specifying principles
for comparatively evaluating nonideal societies, ideal theory can do little more than
present an incomplete and likely distorted picture of the criteria we should use and their
significance relative to each other.
5. CONCLUSION: HOW BEST CASE IDEALS CAN SHARPEN COMPARATIVE
EVALUATION
Let’s return now to the thought that, as Stemplowska and Swift put it, “particular forms
of idealization are extremely useful in helping us to disentangle, clarify, and sometimes
50. See, e.g., David Estlund, “What is Circumstantial About Justice?” Social Philosophy and Policy 33, nos.
1–2 (2016): 292–311; David Estlund, “Prime Justice,” in Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates, ed. Kevin
Vallier andMichael Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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to weigh the competing values that can then be applied to the feasible set.”51 I feel the
intuitive pull of this thought and I expect many others do too. But the usual way of
understanding it tempts us to draw conclusions that fall foul of my arguments above and,
thus, lead us to misconstrue how ideal theory contributes to comparative evaluation.
I want to conclude by proposing (for more detailed investigation elsewhere) a way to
think about how “disentangling” and “clarifying” our normative criteria contributes to
comparative evaluation that is consistent with my conclusion that ideal theory misleads
and distorts our specification of principles for evaluating feasible solutions to real-world
problems.
A typical way of thinking about ideal theory starts from the thought that ideal theories
are normative theories. As such, we think of ideal theories as sets of principles that, on
their own or together with additional premises, imply normative judgments about what
is right or obligatory or good or desirable. On this view, certain kinds of idealizations
help us clarify what our values are, how they are distinct from each other, and how they
come together in our normative judgments. In this way, ideal theory provides a basis
from which we can draw inferences about how we should comparatively evaluate social
possibilities. I have argued against this conclusion.
But there is another way to understand the tasks of “disentang[ling]” and “clar-
ify[ing]. . . competing values” whereby ideal theory can sharpen our evaluative judgments
despite misleading and distorting our reasoning about which criteria to use and how to
weigh them relative to each other. The rough idea is that ideal theory develops idealized
models for conceptual exploration.52 On this picture, certain idealizations can help us to
disentangle closely associated normative concepts and thereby clarify the content of the
concepts we use to articulate evaluative judgments. This conceptual work subsequently
allows us to articulate more precise hypotheses about the principles we should use to
evaluate social possibilities and more accurately assess the normative implications of
endorsing the values picked out by our normative concepts. In this way, ideal theory
can sharpen our normative reasoning even while it misleads and distorts our evaluative
judgments about particular cases.
Since the preceding conclusionmight sound paradoxical to some, I should emphasize
that I am proposing to distinguish sharply between the normative task of specifying
how we are to value particular options—which criteria to use and how to weigh them
51. Stemplowska and Swift, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” 386.
52. Others have suggested similar ideas, but without making the sharp distinction I am proposing here;
see Estlund, “What Good Is It?”; Ismael, “A Philosophy of Science Looks at Idealization in Political Theory”;
McKean, “Ideal Theory After Auschwitz?”
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relative to each other—and the conceptual task of analyzing what we mean when we use
a concept to articulate our normative judgments. My proposal is that we should think of
ideal theory as performing the conceptual task without also performing the normative
task. To illustrate this point, consider the familiar thought that realizing a democratic
society requires constitutional guarantees of certain civil and political liberties: freedomof
speech, freedom of association, freedom of information, and so on.53 We might plausibly
inquire whether the link between democracy and these liberal guarantees is constitutive
or contingent: Is the provision of these liberal guarantees a necessary condition for
being classified as a democracy? Or, instead of constituting a democracy, do these rights
solely support the realization of a democratic society under a (perhaps wide) range of
contingent circumstances? How we answer these questions makes a difference for how
we comparatively evaluate social possibilities: If certain liberal guarantees constitute
a democratic society, then there is no question of evaluating social possibilities in a
manner that permits us to trade off democracy against these liberal rights, for democratic
governance is partly a function of these rights. But if, instead, certain liberal guarantees are
contingent supporting conditions for democratic society, this alerts us to the possibility
of trading off these rights against somemeasure of democracy, at least under some range
of circumstances.
Analyzing an idealized society that abstracts away from compliance problems and
motivational deficiencies is plausibly useful for answering these conceptual questions.
Imagine we construct, as a thought experiment, a hypothetical society in which individual
citizens are committed to treating each other as political equals and this commitment
manifests as a willingness to avoid using certain personal advantages to gain influence
over political procedures that are inconsistent with democratic governance. Let’s also
assume that the citizens of our hypothetical society are committed to pursuing a shared
notion of the common good. Such a thought experiment clearly involves the kind of
idealizations that are familiar to ideal theorists. With these assumptions in place, suppose
we now consider several possible arrangements for making political decisions. As two ex-
amples (among many): we might grant permanent decision-making authority to a single
citizen, who is selected by a rule of hereditary succession (e.g., a hereditary monarch);
or we might grant temporary decision-making authority to a subset of citizens, who are
periodically selected by citizens using majority rule voting (e.g., a legislature composed
53. See, e..g, Corey Brettschneider,Democratic Rights: The Substance of Self-Government (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007); Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of
Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican
Theory and Model of Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
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of elected representatives). Importantly, for our purposes, we assume there is no consti-
tution in place to guarantee rights such as a right to vote, freedom of speech, freedom
of association, and so on. Given this set up, if we accept that some of the hypothetical
societies we examine are recognizably democratic despite the absence of constitution-
ally guaranteed civil and political rights, this is good evidence that such constitutional
guarantees are not constitutive features of a democratic society.54 If, however, we find
it implausible to consider any of these hypothetical societies democratic, then we have
good evidence that such constitutional guarantees are constitutive features of democracy.
The posited idealizations are useful because they bracket many practical concerns that
arise from certain kinds of non-compliance, which might confound our analysis of the
links between democracy and constitutionally guaranteed rights (e.g., a concern that
citizens who are not committed to a principle of political equality will inhibit others’s
participation in political decisions).
Suppose (for the sake of illustration) that our thought experiment leads us to con-
clude that liberal guarantees are not necessary for democratic governance in our ideal
world and, upon further exploration, suppose that we conclude that liberal guarantees
would to some extent impede democratic governance in our ideal world. We should of
course hesitate to draw any normative conclusions from this; realizing somemeasure of
democratic governance in the real world might still require a constitution guaranteeing
certain rights even if this isn’t required for democracy in an ideal world. But that’s my
point. Our ideal theorizing here is meant to turn up conceptual rather than normative
insights. Given our assumptions, it indeed does this. To wit, we learn (by stipulation
here) that liberal guarantees are not constitutive of a democratic society and, further, that
these things can sometimes be in tension with each other. These posited insights are in
turn relevant for comparative evaluation because they sharpen our sense of how these
disparate criteria are related and alert us to the possibility of trade-offs. But we can’t yet
infer anything from our ideal theorizing about how these criteria—democracy and liberal
rights—should bear on our comparative evaluation.
To conclude, then, I propose that we view ideal theory not as presenting normative
theories but as developing models for conceptual exploration, which in turn improves
normative reasoning by sharpening the concepts we use to articulate normative theories.
I haven’t attempted to defend this proposal here, and I expect it will face resistance from
several quarters. Some will object that I’ve given ideal theory too much credit— that, by
bracketing the causes and consequences of real-world problems, ideal theory prevents us




from discovering the conceptual insights needed to diagnose and prescribe remedies for
these problems.55 Others will object that I haven’t given ideal theory enough credit— that
clarifying our normative concepts, as I’ve said ideal theory can do, must imply something
about how we should evaluate social possibilities. These are legitimate concerns; I have
much to say in reply, but I must leave this to another paper. I only hope to have said
enough to provoke further investigation, for my proposal promises a significant benefit:
it allows us to reconcile the claim that ideal theory misleads and distorts our reasoning
about how to evaluate social possibilities with an intuition that it nonetheless aids such
reasoning by sharpening our understanding of the criteria underlying our evaluative
judgments.
55. E.g., Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010),
4–5; Mills, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology.”
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This appendix has several sections. In order:
• A discussion of Estlund’s argument for “justice partitions” in “Just and Juster” (pp.
A1–A4).
• A brief application of the ideal meal analogy to G.A. Cohen’sWhy Not Socialism?
(pp. A4–A5)
• A detailed analysis of themathematicalmodel underlying the thought experiment
in section 3 (pp. A5–A11).
• A discussion that provides some intuition for why the thought experiment is not
a special case (pp. A11–A17).
1. ESTLUND’S ARGUMENT IN “JUST AND JUSTER”
David Estlund has argued that “a systematic theory of. . . the standard of full justice [. . . ]
would be an important resource in developing a rich account of comparative judgments”,1
and somemight take this to support an independent case for defining comparative value
to mean “descriptive similarity to an ideal benchmark”. Estlund’s argument starts with the
observation that many of our confident normative intuitions entail a benchmark or, as he
puts it, a “justice partition”.2 Consider, as examples, judgments such as “Government tor-
ture of political dissidents is severely unjust” or “Slavery is muchmore unjust than gender
wage inequality”; the most natural way to make sense of these claims is by reference to a
notion of “distance from the ideal”.3 Moreover, these “eyeballed comparisons” typically
precede a comparative theory of justice and, indeed, are often taken to constrain a more
systematic comparative theory. This suggests that a natural approach to developing a
1. David Estlund, “Just and Juster,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, ed. David Sobel, Peter Vallen-
tyne, and StevenWall, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 11.
2. I take “benchmark” and “partition” to be synonymous; see Estlund’s note 3.
3. Estlund, “Just and Juster,” 15.
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comparative scale is to build up from our partition-entailing “eyeball judgments”.4 This
conclusion is bolstered by the observation that we can readily think of examples of com-
parative judgments that are “nothing but interpretations of explicit and precise partition
standards.”5 To take two examples from Estlund: “greater purity is nothing but greater
proximity to perfect purity”, and judgments about degrees of arithmetical inequality are
nothing but an intuitive application of the clear partitioned standard of arithmetical
equality.6 If justice is like purity or arithmetical equality—and it might be—then it seems
we have strong reasons to think that our comparative judgments of justice necessarily
make reference to an ideal benchmark.
Recall that a benchmark standard normatively ranks options as a function of their
descriptive similarity to a privileged reference option. For Estlund’s argument to support
the use of benchmark standards, it would have to imply that comparative judgments
of justice are evaluative judgments made in terms of descriptive similarity to an ideal
benchmark. Take, for example, the “eyeball” judgment that “Slavery is much more unjust
than gender wage inequality”; when put more precisely, this would have to mean some-
thing like “Slavery is (justice-wise) much worse than gender wage inequality because a
society with slavery is, descriptively speaking, much less similar to the ideally just society
than is a society with gender wage inequality.” Does Estlund give any reason to think that
this is the right way to interpret our justice comparisons? I take it the analogies to purity
and arithmetical equality are meant to be suggestive on this point. But the comparative
judgments in these cases differ from justice comparisons in a crucial respect. When we
say that slavery is muchmore unjust than gender wage inequality, we typically mean to
imply that slavery is, normatively speaking, much worse than gender wage inequality. But
judgments of degrees of purity or arithmetical equality don’t imply normative conclusions
in a similar way—not, anyway, without accepting a substantive normative thesis about
the value of purity or arithmetical equality: Take two samples of some sodium-based
compound and suppose that one has a higher concentration of sodium than the other; we
don’t thereby conclude that the first is better than the second because it is closer to pure
sodium than the second. Similarly, we don’t typically think that a pair of numbers (e.g.,
100 and 99) is better than another pair of numbers (e.g., 100 and 10) because the former
numbers are closer to arithmetical equality and the latter are not. Judgments of degrees
of purity or arithmetical equality are more naturally thought of as attempts to extrapolate
a graded classification of objects from a binary concept. Justice might be like this; that is,
4. Estlund, “Just and Juster,” 26–9.
5. ibid., 27.
6. ibid., 22, 26.
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assuming that the concept of justice has descriptive or classificatory content, it might be
such that graded classifications with respect to justice are made in terms of descriptive
similarity to a fully just option. I will return to this idea later in the paper. For now, my
point is this: To support the use of benchmark standards, Estlund must show not that,
as a descriptive or classificatory matter, our justice comparisons apply a binary concept
in a graded way; instead, he must show that an option x is judged to have higher value,
normatively speaking, than another option y just in case x is, descriptively speaking,
more similar than y to a fully just option. The purity and arithmetical equality analogies
give us no reason to accept this latter claim.
Suppose Estlund’s analogies establish that, as a descriptive matter, graded justice
comparisons are defined in terms of descriptive similarity to an ideal benchmark. Then, as
a rejoinder, onemight argue as follows: Because the concept of justice has both descriptive
and evaluative content, we can conclude that, for all x and y , x is better than y if x is,
descriptively speaking, more just (or less unjust) than y . For this argument to succeed,
we must first make sure that we are not equivocating between thin and thick notions
of justice.7 The claim Estlund’s analogies are supposed to establish depends on justice
having, in addition to its evaluative content, non-evaluative descriptive content that we
can use to order options by their descriptive similarity to the benchmark. So our initial
supposition requires justice to be a so-called “thick” concept. From this supposition, we
can get to the conclusion by what seems a highly plausible intervening premise: for all x
and y , x is better than y if (and only if) x is more just than y . This premise is surely true if
justice is a thin concept like good or permissible—if it is a general evaluative concept with
positive normative connotations but without any non-evaluative descriptive content. But
then the argument for the conclusion commits the fallacy of equivocation. If, instead, we
understand justice to be a thick concept, then this intervening premise is not obviously
true; at any rate, it states the conclusion that is to be established.
Assuming throughout, then, that justice is a thick concept, wemight instead argue that
the conclusion follows from our initial supposition by the definition of a thick concept.
But that’s not right. To see why, consider an exemplary thick concept such as generosity,
and imagine we are considering two options such that x is, descriptively speaking, more
generous than y . From all we’ve said so far, we can’t yet infer that x is better or more
valuable than y . We need, in addition, a substantive normative theory of generosity
that implies that more generosity is better than less. The same point holds for justice
understood as a thick concept. Let’s even suppose that it’s a constraint on any plausible
7. For an introduction to thin and thick normative concepts, see Pekka Väyrynen, Thick Ethical Concepts,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) 2017.
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conception of justice that full justice translates into maximum normative value. Even still,
for any two less-than-fully just options x and y such that x is, descriptively speaking, more
just (or less unjust) than y , we must establish a substantive normative theory of justice to
infer that x thereby has greater normative value than y . (Insofar as we find this normative
thesis obvious, I submit it is because we are implicitly relying on a thin notion of justice.)
A particular substantive theory of justice may be enough to establish that we can reliably
evaluate options in terms of their descriptive similarity to a particular ideal. At best,
however, this gives us an argument for using some particular benchmark standard once
we are persuaded to accept some particular theory of justice. But the point of this section
is to consider arguments for the practical relevance of benchmark standards in general,
arguments that are meant to hold prior to working out the substance of justice. Barring
an argument for that more general conceptual claim, claim (2a) remains questionable as
a defense of the practical value of ideal theory in general.8
2. THE IDEAL MEAL ANALOGY AND COHEN’S WHY NOT SOCIALISM?
To show that Rawls’s ideal theory isn’t the only one to fit the idealmeal analogy, this section
briefly describes G.A. Cohen’s argument for a socialist ideal in hisWhy Not Socialism?
Cohen’s argument revolves around a thought experiment about a camping trip. Those
who go on the camping trip recognize each other as peers, and they have all the resources
they need for an enjoyable trip.9 Using this thought experiment, we imagine ourselves
participating in various hypothetical camping trips in which interactions among partici-
pants are regulated by alternative sets of principles. In particular, we compare a camping
trip organized according to liberal principles of market exchange and private ownership
of resources with a camping trip organized along Cohen’s favored socialist principles of
equal opportunity and community.10 The fact that the socialist camping trip is intuitively
more desirable than the liberal camping trip is taken as preliminary evidence for the
normative superiority of Cohen’s socialist ideal.11 Of course, the camping trip presents
a special kind of situation, so we might wonder how far our intuitions about this case
extend to our normative judgments about the organization of modern societies. Yet
Cohen “do[es] not see that the stated differences [between the camping trip and modern
8. Estlund’s argument that our intuitive partition-entailing comparisons present a constraint on a more
comprehensive comparative theory might be thought to present yet another way to make ideals relevant for
comparative evaluation. I address this potential rejoinder in section 4 of the paper.
9. G. A. Cohen,Why Not Socialism? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3.
10. ibid., 4–9; Cohen explicates his socialist principles in chap. 2.
11. ibid., 1.
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societies] undermine the desirability of the spread across society of camping trip val-
ues.”12 He acknowledges that society-wide implementation of socialist principles faces
serious feasibility obstacles, but these “are not reasons to disparage the ideal itself.”13 Set
aside whether Cohen is right on this last point. My point is that, according to Cohen (and
Rawls, among others), the reasoning by which we identify the defining attributes of the
ideal society centrally involves evaluating the (counterfactual) realization of candidate
principles in a specific range of social circumstances.
3. THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR SECTION 3 OF THE TEXT
Recall the initial set up of our thought experiment. We are evaluating possible societies
with the aim of choosing the best overall feasible solution to some real-world problem. We
describe possible societies in terms of freedom and equality and wemeasure the extent
to which possible societies realize these criteria using two continuously measurable
variables, f and e, which range from 0 (complete absence) to 1 (full realization). We
assume for simplicity that these criteria exhaust our normative concerns.
We assume that our comparative evaluations of possible societies can be represented
by the value function
V (e, f ) = 3e +2 f . (1)
This function implies the dashed indifference (i.e., equal value) lines in figure 1, with
comparative value increasing as we move from the bottom left corner to the top right
corner of the graph. In addition to my remarks about this function in the text, I wish to
note that it represents our comparative value judgments as being continuous in equality
and freedom. Roughly, this means that, for any two options, if they differ very slightly in
the extent to which they realize (e.g.) equality, and they are otherwise identical, then the
difference in their comparative value is similarly slight. I submit that using a continuous
value function strengthens our intuition in favor of using benchmark standards as a guide
to comparative value and, thus, makes my job harder. To wit, if we are faced with a choice
problem andmade aware that comparative value is not a continuous function of options’
descriptive attributes— if, that is, a slight change in descriptive attributes can produce a
large jump in value—then we should expect that, at least for some pairs of descriptively
similar options x and x′, moving from x to x′ will entail a substantial change in value.




Recognizing this possibility gives us some reason to suspect that an option y might be
closer in value to x despite being less similar to x than is x′. In contrast, if we are faced
with a choice problem and told that comparative value is a continuous function of our
normative criteria, thenwewould have little prima facie reason to suspect that descriptive
similarity would be a misleading guide to comparative value; by assumption, after all, two
descriptively similar options have nearly the same normative value. Exploring a case in
which comparative value is a continuous function of our two criteria thus has the benefit,
if persuasive, of demonstrating that benchmark standards can mislead our evaluative
judgments even in those cases for which we have a strong expectation that they should
be an accurate guide to comparative value.14
We define the ideal society as the option that maximizes normative value as encoded
by the function V . Since V implies that normative value is increasing in both e and f , it is
straightforward to see that the society that maximizes normative value is one at which
both criteria are fully realized: e = 1 and f = 1. As a warm up for what’s to come, note
that the standard mathematical technique for identifying the ideal is to take the partial
derivatives of the Lagrangean function15 Lwith respect to the variables e, f , ∏, and µ:
L(e, f ,∏,µ) = 3e +2 f −∏(e −1)−µ( f −1). (2)




µ(1− f ) = 0
(3)
Solving these equations for e and f , we confirm that the ideal society is such that e = 1
and f = 1.16
14. It bears mentioning that the type of case we’re considering here lies beyond David Estlund’s discussion
of the “fallacy of approximation” (David Estlund,Utopophobia: On the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy
[Princeton: Princeton University Press, Forthcoming], chap. 14). In all the cases he considers, what renders
approximation reasoning invalid is the fact that comparative value is a discontinuous function of options’
descriptive attributes; e.g., in his pills case, health is discontinuous in the number of pills one takes.
15. See any textbook on constrained optimization for discussion of the Langrangean function.
16. Onemight complain at this point that themathematics is useless—we certainly don’t need it to establish
that the ideal society fully realizes our criteria; worse, it is a distracting departure from ordinary normative
reasoning. To forestall distractions, let me register two points here. The first point is that we have not yet
reached the point of the thought experiment where the mathematics earns its keep. In a moment, we will
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Figure 1. Comparative value map
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Figure 2. Similarity map
Having characterized the ideal society, we wish to see whether, for a given feasibility
constraint, the nonideal society that has the highest comparative value as encoded byV is
also the nonideal society that is most similar to the ideal given some similarity metric. We
focus here on the use of mathematical measures of descriptive similarity (there’s nothing
else to say about principle-counting measures beyond what’s in the text).
For concreteness, let our feasibility constraint be as in the text:
F = {(e, f ) ∈ [0,1]2 ￿ f +e2−1 ≤ 0}. (4)
This implies that the feasible societies are those on and to the left of the solid line in
figures 1 and 2. Using the same technique as above, we identify the most valuable
nonideal society—the society in the constraint set F that maximizes V —by taking the
partial derivatives of the amended Lagrangean functionL′ with respect to the variables e,
explore howmeasures of descriptively similarity can diverge frommeasures of comparative value in ways
that are difficult to detect by intuition alone; for this, we will want a way to make these measures precise,
which the mathematics enables us to do. More generally, what’s most important about the case we are
exploring is that it faithfully represents the core logical structure of a familiar form of normative reasoning.
The idealization of mathematical precision is introduced as a reasoning aid for analyzing the implications of
defining abstract concepts (such as ideal, descriptive similarity, and comparative value) in a particular way.
In addition to allowing us to define these abstract concepts precisely, the mathematics supplements and
disciplines our intuitions when drawing inferences from the initial set up of the case.
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f , and ∏:
L′(e, f ,∏) = 3e +2 f −∏( f +e2−1). (5)
This gives us the first-order necessary conditions for the most valuable nonideal society:
3−2∏e = 0
2−∏ = 0
∏( f +e2−1) = 0 (6)
Solving these equations for e and f , we find that the nonideal society that maximizes
overall normative value (as encoded by V ) is such that e = 0.75 and f = 0.4375.
Now turning to the nonideal society that is most similar to the ideal, we start with
the Euclidean metric presented in the text. Let x = (e, f ) denote an arbitrary society and
let x∗ = (1,1) denote the ideal society. For all x, the Euclidean distance between x and x∗
is
dE(x,x∗) =￿(e −1)2+( f −1)2. (7)
Given F and dE , the standardmathematical technique for identifying the nonideal society
that is closest to the ideal (and thus most descriptively similar to the ideal) is to find the
values for e and f that minimize the function
L(e, f ,∏) =￿(e −1)2−( f −1)2−∏( f +e2−1). (8)
This implies the dotted indifference (i.e., equal distance) curves in figure 2, with relative
similarity increasing as we move from the bottom left corner to the top right corner of
the graph. This gives us a system of equations that indicate the first-order necessary
conditions for a distance-minimizing nonideal society:
e −1￿(e −1)2+( f −1)2 −2∏e = 0
f −1￿(e −1)2+( f −1)2 −∏ = 0
∏( f +e2−1) = 0
(9)
Solving this system of equations for e and f , we find that the nonideal society that is most
similar to the ideal (assuming the Euclidean metric) is one at which e ≈ 0.59 and f ≈ 0.65.
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This establishes the claim the text: the nonideal society that is most similar to the ideal
(according to the Euclidean metric) differs from the nonideal society with the highest
comparative value.
What about alternate distance metrics? Another commonmetric is theManhattan
metric, which is defined as
dM(x,x∗) = ￿e −1￿+ ￿ f −1￿. (10)
Given F and dM , and using the same technique as above, the nonideal society that is most
similar to the ideal is one at which e = 0.5 and f = 0.75.
In fact, the Manhattan and Euclidean metrics are special cases of the Minkowski
metric, defined as
dp(x,x∗) = p￿￿e −1￿p + ￿ f −1￿p . (11)
If p = 1, then dp(x,x∗) is the Manhattan metric, and if p = 2, then dp(x,x∗) is the Eu-
clidean metric. The Minkowski generalization allows us to define a distinct distance
measure for all positive integers. The limiting case, as p goes to∞, gives us the Chebyshev
metric, defined as
dC(x,x∗) =max{￿e −1￿, ￿ f −1￿}. (12)
We can now show that there is no p such that the nonideal society that is most similar
to the ideal matches the nonideal society with the highest comparative value. Let’s start
with the observations in table 1, where e(p) and f (p) are the approximate values for
e and f at the nonideal society most similar to the ideal for the specified Dp . Table 1
indicates a clear pattern: as p goes toward infinity, e converges to 0.618034 from below
and f converges to the same value from above. What’s important to notice here is that,
for all p, the nonideal society that is most similar to the ideal is such that the following
statements are true:
• e ≤ 0.618034;
• f ≥ 0.618034;
• e ≤ f .
In contrast, the nonideal society with the highest comparative value is one at which
e = 0.75 and f = 0.4375. This establishes an important result for this model: for an
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dp e(p) f (p)
p = 1 0.5 0.75
p = 2 0.59 0.65
p = 5 0.6095 0.628
p = 10 0.614 0.623
p = 20 0.616 0.620
p = 100 0.6176 0.6185
p = 200 0.6179 0.6183
p = 1000 0.6180 0.6181
p→∞ 0.618034 0.618034
Table 1. Most similar nonideal societies for a range of
similarity measures
infinitely large class of distance metrics, the nonideal society that is most similar to the
ideal differs in notable ways from the nonideal society with the highest comparative value.
As noted in the text, somemight worry that the mathematical precision makes this
an unusual case of normative reasoning and thus provides no basis for skepticism about
the use of benchmark standards in more ordinary normative reasoning. In reply, I note
that where the case departs from ordinary normative reasoning, it does so to make it
harder to achieve my objective in this section. As I noted above, assumptions such as
continuously measurable normative criteria and a comparative value function that is
continuous in these criteria are designed to strengthen our intuition against denying
the practical relevance of benchmark standards. The fact that benchmark standards can
be shown to mislead comparative evaluations even when we assume conditions that
ostensibly work against this conclusion should lead us to worry that they mislead in cases
where less conducive conditions obtain. Moreover, once we understand what it means
for comparative value to be a continuous function of options’ descriptive attributes, we
can readily see how a benchmark standard can mislead our comparative value judgments
when the latter is a discontinuous function of descriptive attributes. Hence, insofar as
ordinary normative reasoning departs from the case we’ve considered by failing to satisfy
the assumed continuity conditions, our case gives us reason to worry that the lesson
drawn here is relevant for more familiar forms of normative reasoning.
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4. NOTES TOWARD GENERALIZING THE MODEL
One might reasonably wonder whether the example above has been cherry-picked to
support the conclusion that similarity judgments can mislead with respect to compar-
ative value—whether, that is, this conclusion is robust to alternate ways of specifying
V , d , and F . Should we expect our similarity judgments to be misleading with respect to
comparative value judgments in general, however wemight specifyV , d , or F ? Presenting
a conclusive answer to this question is best left to a separate paper, as it involves intro-
ducing more advanced mathematical concepts and techniques than can be productively
introduced in the context of this appendix. Nevertheless, we can use the above example
to provide some intuition for why we should be generally skeptical about using similarity
judgments as a guide to comparative value (as well as some intuition for how wemight go
about proving a more general theorem to this effect).







f −1 = 2e1 (14)
Since (6) states necessary conditions for a most valuable nonideal society, expression (13)
does so as well. And since (9) states necessary conditions for a most similar nonideal
society, expression (14) does likewise. Now observe that a possible society must satisfy
both conditions to be simultaneously a most valuable and amost similar nonideal society.
Noticing that the right-hand sides of (13) and (14) are identical, it follows that candidates
to be, simultaneously, both the most similar nonideal society and the most valuable




f −1 . (15)
For convenience, call the possible societies that satisfy this restriction “candidates for
convergence”. Whereas (13) and (14) are tied to a particular feasibility specification,
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(15) sets aside any mention of feasibility.17 Geometrically, this condition implies that
candidates for convergence are the societies where the slope of the (dashed) equal value
lines matches the slope of the (dotted) equal similarity curves. These are the societies
represented by the points that fall along the upward sloping solid line in figure 3.
We pause to note that candidates for convergence must satisfy a “knife-edge” condi-

























where, for example, @V@e is the partial derivative of V with respect to e. Letting g(e, f ) = −1+ f + e2 be the
function used to circumscribe the feasible set, (e.g.) @g@e is the partial derivative of the feasibility frontier
with respect to e. Condition (15) abstracts from feasibility because, as is apparent in its general statement, it
makes no mention of the function used to circumscribe the feasible set.
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tion and, thus, candidates for convergence are atypical among possible societies. I trust
that the way I have put the point here provides some intuition for why it holds beyond our
particular specifications of V and d above. By varying the slopes of the (dashed and dot-
ted) level curves in figure 3, one should be able to visualize that there are infinitely many
specifications of V and d such that the points at which the graphs of the two functions
are tangent to each other are atypical among possible societies.
The upshot of this preliminary discussion is that expressions (13)–(15) impose restric-
tions on the set of feasibility specifications for which the most similar nonideal society
is also a most valuable nonideal society. Stated informally, for our similarity judgments
to be an accurate guide to comparative value, the boundary of the feasible set must pass
through a candidate for convergence and, further, its slope at this point of intersection
must be equal to the (identical) slopes of the equal value and equal similarity curves at
this point. We now provide some intuition for why feasibility specifications that satisfy
these conditions are “rare” in an important sense.
Let’s start by considering a feasibility specification that represents a slight modifica-
tion of F above (see expression (4)):
F ′ ≡ ￿(e, f ) ∈ [0,1]2 ￿ f +e2− 67
48
≤ 0￿ . (16)
This feasibility constraint is represented by the downward sloping solid line in the top
right corner of fig. 3; according to F ′, all possible societies on and to the left of that line
are feasible. One should be able to see from the graph that the slope of this feasibility
frontier is equal to the (identical) slopes of the dashed and dotted equivalence curves at
the point where it crosses the line identifying the candidates for convergence. And we
can confirm analytically (using the same techniques as above) that the point ￿34 , 56￿—the
candidate for convergence through which the feasibility frontier passes— is both the
most similar nonideal society and the most valuable nonideal society given F ′. Contrast
this scenario with the one depicted earlier by figs. 1 and 2, where we can see that the slope
of the feasibility frontier matches the slopes of the equal value and equal similarity curves
at distinct points and, thus, not at a candidate for convergence.
F ′ is an example of a feasibility specification for which the most similar nonideal
society is also themost valuable nonideal society, givenV and d as specified above. In fact,
F ′ is a special case of a more general form of feasibility constraint, which parameterizes
an infinitely large set of feasibility specifications for which our similarity judgments are
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an accurate guide to comparative value:




ø ≤ 0￿ . (17)
For each −14 < ø ≤ 34 , F ′(ø) defines a feasible set that picks out a candidate for convergence
as both the most similar nonideal society and the most valuable nonideal society (the
specification in (16) is for ø = 0).
If F ′(ø) picks out an infinitely large set of feasibility specifications for which our
similarity judgments are an accurate guide to comparative value, how can such feasibility
specifications be “rare”, as I indicated above? Obviously, “rare” can’t here mean “few in
number”. Instead, “rare” means “atypical” where, roughly speaking, a feasibility specifica-
tion is “atypical” if it is defined by some extremely precise “knife-edge” conditionsC so
that, for any feasibility specification F that satisfiesC , there are infinitely many specifica-
tions F ′ that are arbitrarily similar to F yet nonetheless fail to satisfyC .18 Consequently,
were we to pick a feasibility specification at random, it would be highly unlikely to satisfy
C . Our candidates for convergence above help provide some intuition for this idea: There
are infinitely many candidates for convergence (all the points that fall along the upward
sloping solid line in fig. 3), but for every candidate c , there are infinitely many points that
are arbitrarily close to c that nonetheless fail to satisfy condition (15). Thus, although
there are infinitely many candidates for convergence, they are “rare”— if we were drawing
a possible society at random, we would hardly expect to draw a point on the candidate
line.
Using F ′(ø) as a starting point, we can provide some intuition for the claim that
feasibility specifications that satisfy conditions (13)–(15) are atypical and thus “rare” in
the relevant sense. Put differently, to satisfy conditions (13)–(15), F ′(ø) must satisfy
extremely precise “knife-edge” conditions, and arbitrarily small departures from these
conditions yields feasibility specifications for which the most similar nonideal society
deviates from the most valuable nonideal society. To see this point, consider




ø ≤ 0￿ , (18)
18. To be precise, the relevant mathematical concept here is that of a generic property. That is, one way
to show that our similarity judgments are generally unreliable is to show that certain necessary conditions
for being an accurate guide are not generically satisfied by feasibility specifications. This is a difficult
mathematical concept, so we set aside a more formal application of it for the purposes of this appendix in
the hopes of conveying some important intuitions.
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with æ being any real number. Notice that F ′(ø) = F ′(ø,æ = 0), which implies that F ′(ø)
is just a special case of a more general form of feasibility constraint. More importantly, for
each ø and æ ≠ 0, F ′(ø,æ) parameterizes infinitely many small adjustments to F ′(ø). To
make thus point concrete, let ø = 0.5. F ′(ø = 0.5,æ = 0) is a feasibility specification that
picks out a candidate for convergence, (0.25,0.5), as both the most similar and most valu-
able nonideal society. Now consider an extremely small adjustment, F ′(ø = 0.5,æ = 0.01).
This small adjustment is enough to render our similarity judgments an inaccurate guide
to comparative value; under this modification, the most similar nonideal society is(0.2423,0.4965) whereas the most valuable nonideal society is (0.24,0.5). Moreover,
this disparity between the most similar and most valuable nonideal societies holds for
any adjustment æ ≠ 0, with the magnitude of divergence increasing as æ gets farther from
0.19 The explanation for this disparity is simple: these arbitrarily small adjustments to
F ′(ø) are sufficient to ensure that, where it passes through a candidate for convergence,
the slope of the feasibility frontier does not match the slopes of the equal value and equal
similarity curves. The upshot is that F ′(ø) specifies a set of feasibility specifications for
which convergence between our similarity judgments and comparative value judgments
is extremely sensitive to small changes to specification of the feasibility frontier. Con-
sequently, although we can identify feasibility specifications for which our similarity
judgments are an accurate guide to comparative value, these specifications are atypical.
Amidst uncertainty about the shape of the feasibility frontier, it would be unreasonable to
expect it to satisfy these knife-edge conditions and thus unreasonable to conclude that
our similarity judgments are typically accurate with regard to comparative value.
To show that our analysis in the previous paragraph is not specific to F ′(ø), consider




￿￿2−1 ≤ 0￿ . (19)
Like F ′(ø), F ′′(ø) is an example of an infinitely large set of feasibility specifications for
which our similarity judgments are an accurate guide to comparative value.20 Also like
F ′(ø), F ′′(ø) is just a special case of a more general form of feasibility constraint, such as




￿￿2−1 ≤ 0￿ . (20)
19. I have created an interactive online version of fig. 3 where the reader can visually explore what happens
as ø and æ vary. Please see https://www.desmos.com/calculator/ybum9znd0j.
20. So long as − 3√
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For all æ ≠ 0, F ′′(ø,æ) implies that the most similar nonideal society diverges from the
most valuable nonideal society (I leave it to the reader to confirm this). Thus, for all ø,
arbitrarily small adjustments to F ′′(ø) imply that the most similar nonideal society is
not the most valuable nonideal society. Since æ could be any real number, it would be
unreasonable to expect that æ = 0 and, thus, to expect that our similarity judgments are
an accurate guide to comparative value.
Summarizing this section: Our similarity judgments are an accurate guide to com-
parative value for a given feasible set F when, for F , the most similar nonideal society is
also a most valuable nonideal society. There are, however, infinitely many ways that the
feasible set might turn out and, even if we can rule out some feasibility specifications as
implausible, we can’t be sure which of the remaining specifications is the one that actually
constrains our choice.21 Our similarity judgments are a reliable guide to comparative
value when, despite this uncertainty, we can reasonably expect our similarity judgments
to be an accurate guide, i.e., we can reasonably expect the feasible set to turn out such
that the most similar nonideal society is also the most valuable nonideal society. In this
appendix, I’ve used examples to provide some intuition for why we should be generally
skeptical of the claim that our similarity judgments are a reliable guide to comparative
value. I’ve done this by, first, identifying some conditions that must be satisfied by V ,
d , and F for our similarity judgments to be an accurate guide for a given F . I’ve then
shown that, although we can identify many feasibility specifications that can satisfy these
conditions for given V and d , these feasibility specifications are atypical— for any one
of them, there are many arbitrarily similar feasibility specifications that, despite their
close similarity, fail to satisfy the specified necessary conditions for the same V and d .
This is because the indicated necessary conditions are stringent and their satisfaction is
extremely sensitive to small adjustments to their defining parameters. The upshot is that,
given our uncertainty about which feasibility specification constrains our choice, it would
be unreasonable to expect the feasible set to be specified precisely so as to satisfy the
conditions required for our similarity judgments to be an accurate guide to comparative
value. Hence, we should be skeptical that our similarity judgments are a reliable guide.
To be sure, I have not offered a general and conclusive proof of this conclusion. This
task is left for a separate, more technical paper. I take my task in this paper to be that of
raising doubt about the use of relative descriptive similarity to a best case ideal as a guide
for choosing among nonideal options, and this as a means to motivating investigation of
an alternative, perhaps more fruitful way to look at the relationship between ideal theory
21. For example, we might be able to rule out as implausible all feasibility specifications except those
parameterized by F ′(ø,≤) yet be uncertain about the true values of ø and ≤.
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and comparative evaluation. My sense is that this is best accomplished, as a first pass,
by analyzing an example that allows us to diagnose and explain in an intuitive manner
how similarity judgments can mislead. The point of this last section of the appendix is to
indicate why the example used in the paper (and in section 3 above) is not a special case
but is representative of a more general class of cases. This is to assure the reader that the
conclusions drawn from the chosen example are robust to a wide range of specifications
for our comparative value and descriptive similarity judgments.
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